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Breaking cycles of subjugation through bodily performance: lived experience
inside legal processes at the Marikana Commission of Inquiry
Abstract
On 16th August 2012, the South African Police Service fired live ammunition into a crowd of striking
mineworkers, killing 34 men and severely wounding others. Subsequently known as the Marikana
massacre, the Marikana Commission of Inquiry was soon instituted to uncover the ‘truth’ about what had
happened. This article suggests that such linear attempts at truth-finding excise bodily rhythms, resulting
in a truth-finding exercise that risks redundancy and irrelevance for key stakeholders impacted by atrocity.
Interrogating theoretical insights around corporeality, performance and rhythm to critique ideals of legal
progress and aims of closure and truth exposition, this article uses encountered bodily performance as
an analytical touchstone to reveal a parallel, cyclical rhythm inside the linear operation of the law. The
article suggests that a prioritisation of such bodily performance – foregrounding the lived experience
inside the law of truth-seeking – can make truth recovery more relevant to key stakeholders. Such bodily
performance also demonstrates a pathway to breaking the cycle of bodily subjugation to positivist legal
undertakings, by creating sensory bridges between key stakeholders inside the Marikana Commission of
Inquiry.
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Breaking cycles of subjugation
through bodily performance: lived
experience inside legal processes at
the Marikana Commission of Inquiry
Robyn Gill-Leslie1

1 Introduction
On 16th August 2012, the South African Police Service (SAPS) fired
live ammunition into a crowd of striking mine-workers at Marikana,
a platinum mine operated by Lonmin near Rustenburg, South Africa.
17 people died in the initial volley of bullets, which was caught on
the camera rolls of numerous media houses that were on-site covering
the strike and its ensuing unrest. The disturbing footage was soon
circulated both domestically and abroad2 – but it did not show the
scene of the second shooting, where strikers attempting to escape
police fire were followed by the SAPS into the surrounding scrublands.
A further 17 people were killed near a small, rocky outcrop, about half
a kilometre from the initial scene. In total, 34 miners were killed that
day, in what was soon dubbed ‘the Marikana massacre’. In response to
this outrageous police action, then-President Jacob Zuma instituted a
Commission of Inquiry, a quasi-legal mechanism with British roots
that is commonly used in countries that have inherited English law
through colonial history. This article takes issue with such a legalistic
approach to truth-finding after atrocity, questioning the sense and
Law Text Culture Vol 25 2021 00
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applicability of a teleological legal process that prioritises ideas of
forensic truth and a quest for closure – if it comes at the expense of
bodily experience.

Foregrounding bodily experience, as framed through Marett
Leiboff’s work on theatrical jurisprudence, alongside interrogations
of aesthetics, corporeality and rhythm, this article critiques ideas
of legal progress and aims of closure and truth exposition. Bringing
bodily experience to the centre of analysis, as opposed to linear,
legal procedure, reveals an alternative appraisal of truth-seeking at
Marikana. Examined from a corporeal perspective, it is possible to see
an alternative rhythm at the Commission, developed by prioritising
how physical bodies engaged with legal procedures. Travel, bodily fear
and safety concerns, and financial exclusion demonstrate how bodies
were trapped into cyclical rhythms of interaction with legal procedure;
their repetitive performances in stark contrast to the linear pathways
of legal processes.

Deploying Mariana Valverde’s critique on legal teleology,
this alternative bodily rhythm raises the sobering concerns of the
Commission as a place of danger, not truth and justice; the fact
that some kinds of bodily absence were interpreted as a reflection of
privilege, which joined with financial exclusion in creating a hierarchy
of stakeholders that is counter to the ideal of equality before the law;
and that bodily absence resulted in a disjunction or fragmentation
between bodies and their worlds – whether through the presence
of voice without the corresponding corporeality or the splitting of
attendees, who divided themselves numerous times between lives at
home and lives at the Commission.
This alternative, cyclical rhythm was present throughout the
Commission, and can be discovered by foregrounding bodily
performance through iterative reading of the legal transcripts of the
Marikana Commission – a rhythm created by bodily presence and
absence, speaking, saying and showing as ‘experts in their own lifeworlds’ (Tilley 2017: 39). If, as Henri Lefebvre suggests, linear and
cyclical rhythms are based on ‘antagonistic unity’ (2004: 76), then
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the operation of two rhythms inside the law – one celebrated and the
other dismissed – suggests that an acknowledgment of the implications
of bodily experience – an acknowledgment of cyclicality alongside
teleology – would have made this mechanism more relevant to key
stakeholders and, crucially, could have allowed the Commission to
better manage the expectations of what it could reasonably be expected
to achieve. But the foregrounding of bodily performance not only
highlights problematic cyclicality and alternative legal rhythms – it
can also demonstrate how physical performance can break the cyclical
subjugation of how non-legal bodies engage with truth recovery
mechanisms.
2 Bodily presence inside the law
The idea of examining justice and truth-seeking by linking a body
and its lived experience has been highlighted by the work of Carrol
Clarkson. In her book The Aesthetics of Transitional Justice, Clarkson
references Jacques Rancière’s identification of an aesthetic regime
of art – one that removes norms of representation, allowing for the
boundaries of the visible and audible to change (Rancière 2004: 4).
Clarkson describes Rancière’s aesthetic acts as an ‘encounter that
makes it possible to reset social perceptions of what counts and what
matters, especially in relation to questions of social justice’ (Clarkson
2014: 2). Clarkson argues that knowledge ‘obtained through the
senses’ – or rather, ‘lived experience’ – is the original definition of the
Greek word aesthesis, the root from which ‘aesthetic’ is derived. Thus,
Rancière’s aesthetic acts could be seen as lived experience, processed
through the senses, which makes it possible to ‘reset social perceptions
of what counts and what matters’ (Clarkson 2014: 2).
Clarkson’s use of the word ‘encounter’ when describing recalibrating
perceptions around lived experiences of justice is particularly interesting
for this article’s examination of bodily performance inside the law of
the Marikana Commission – a mechanism designed to uncover truth
about police murder. Writing about Hindi cinema and extra-legal
murder by Mumbai police, Anustup Basu engages with this word in
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three ways: he first describes ‘encounter’ as a legal definition, meaning
the exchange of gunfire between police and criminal suspects; the
second is a colloquialism – in common parlance, an ‘encounter’ is used
to describe vigilantism from the police, where suspects are often shot
from behind to simulate escape (a grim feature shared by the Marikana
crime scene); the third definition is from Hindi cinema – the ‘encounter’
film genre which focuses on realism and gritty authenticity, as a direct
counter to the mythical and fantastical Bollywood films of the 1980s
(2010: 182-184). In particular, the encounter film genre focuses on a
hero who is authentically, even aggressively ordinary. His very averageness is used to propel him and his actions into the spotlight – there is
nothing inherently exceptional about him (Basu 2010: 183).
Drawing on these three strands, Basu ultimately def ines
‘encounter’ as something between the ‘immanence of daily life and
the transcendence of the state’ (2010: 184). As extra-legal killing, an
encounter of this kind ensures that the body falls between the law –
as an act of vigilantism committed by an officer of the law, the death
does not have to be formalised through institutions or bureaucracy;
the sovereign state claims this act as a ‘just exception’ to otherwise
human-rights centred rhetoric (Basu 2010: 187). But perhaps the most
relevant part of Basu’s definition on ‘encounter’, is that he defines this
act of killing as both invisible and visible, something that must be
accidental and thus excused from formal judicial process and, yet, must
be recognised and acknowledged by the public as intended. Only the
combination of these two supposedly paradoxical elements – public
visibility and bureaucratic secrecy – gives the encounter its power, a
way to demonstrate the power of the state over its residents, whether
citizen or not (Basu 2010: 184).

Returning to Clarkson’s interpretation of Rancière’s aesthetic acts
as a sort of encounter, it is possible to see lived experience – or bodily
performativity – as that critical link between daily life and the power
of the state, when considering state-sponsored truth recovery after
violence; but a critical link that remains ignored, rejected or sidelined by
conventional understandings of law and legal procedure. This is one of
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Marett Leiboff’s key critiques in her work on theatrical jurisprudence.
In her book Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence, Leiboff challenges
positivist jurisprudence which she terms ‘law without life’, highlighting
how modern law and legal institutions have been reduced to mere acts
of seeing, not acknowledging law’s inevitable impact on lifeworlds
surrounding it (2019: 6). She writes that modern law operates on the
incorrect assumption that rules and legal instruments stripped bare
offer clarity; which ignores the fact that legal selves will always bring
their own assumptions, experiences and perspectives into their work.
Modern law seems to think it is ‘immune from the world around it’
(Leiboff 2019: 24). But with no focus or attention on how law impacts
the lifeworlds around it, law becomes endlessly self-referential, abstract
and ultimately without responsibility for its consequences. Law delimits
by creating a closed world around itself, and aims to ‘protect’ the legal
interpreter from bodily unruliness – the bodies inside law end up
papered over by doctrine and dogma (Leiboff 2019: 24-25).

Leiboff suggests using a theatrical lens to bring the law and legal
interpreters back to bodily knowledge, reminding law of the worlds
that created it. The idea that theatre is reserved for the stage is an
outdated premise – as Leiboff (2019) states, theatre only requires
bodies and space. In this interpretation, any set of bodily interactions
has the potential to be theatrical – even the legal sphere. Framing
the law inside a conception of theatricality becomes powerful when
considering what a theatrical response asks of those bodies engaged
in space. A theatrical response, as Leiboff understands it, is one that
prompts bodies to respond first, prior to an intellectual evaluation.
Law assumes that actions follow thoughts – rational law has no space
for experiences that don’t follow causality, despite the mistakes that
are commonly made when we rely on our minds only. But, grounded
in bodily response, a theatrical approach is acutely aware of impact
beyond the self, awareness triggered by lived experience, followed by
an intellectual response (Leiboff 2019: 12). Such a focused response
would allow the law to react to legal injustices that a rational and
deductive legal approach ignores, glosses over or considers irrelevant.
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Leiboff reminds us that our minds and our bodies are interactive –
there is no sensible form of separation between them; while Clarkson
highlights that lived experience can help recalibrate how justice is felt,
perceived and prioritised. The theoretical link between these two ideas
is the foregrounding of bodily response: ensuring that bodily impacts
and experiences are seen as integral to discussions of law and justice.
Framing such lived experience as an ‘encounter’ demonstrates how
the everyday and ordinary can provide a crucial link to truth-seeking,
performing as the bridge between daily life and the power of the state.
With the foregrounding of physical experience, as highlighted
by Clarkson and Leiboff, ideas of movement and rhythm become
key analytical touchstones for investigating corporeality. As Janine
Clark argues, bodies are in a permanent state of becoming, making
corporeality a dynamic and ever-changing space (2019: 17). Without
taking movement and rhythm into account, any theorising of the
body falls prey to the analytical trap of positionality: decoding how
something or someone was formed, by interrogating only the structural
conditions that surround it (Massumi 2002: 2).

Brian Massumi argues that this kind of positionality captures a
body ‘in a cultural freeze-frame’ (2002: 3) which denies the possibility
of movement and change – a direct contradiction to the inherent
dynamism of bodily experience. Yet, conventional western views of
law require exactly such a ‘freeze-frame’ from those who interact with
it – a predefined and specific set of spatial and temporal characteristics,
before law and bodies’ engagements therewith can be considered ‘real’.
Renisa Mawani highlights how temporal linearity inside the law is often
assumed rather than interrogated, with time being considered a ‘natural’
phenomenon that follows a ‘sequential and directional line’ onto which
lives can be mapped (2014: 69-70). As Carol Greenhouse states in her
seminal article on linearity inside the law, the West sees temporality
and legality as ‘conceptually fused’ (1989: 1631). Modern notions of law
that respect, for example, precedent, reinforce a continual expansion of
legal linearity: using past legal decisions to inform the present – which,
in turn, builds a foundation for the future (Greenhouse 1989: 1642). In
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a similar vein, Jessica Cooper argues that jurisdiction performs the same
enforcement of legal linearity – defining the limitations of actions and
capacities a body is responsible for, based on a fixed time (2018: 87).

Arguing against such reductive linearity, Mariana Valverde suggests
that legal procedures, like literary genres, are products of specific spaces
and times (2015: 11). She uses the term ‘chronotope’ to identify the
manner in which temporal and spatial aspects of law influence one
another (Valverde 2015: 9) and uses the example of a court – which
is only a court when a member of the judiciary has opened session; at
other times, it is simply a room in a building. Legal time and space
do not start at a beginning and halt at a satisfactory end, despite the
aforementioned conventional ideas of law’s linearity (Valverde 2015: 43).

This falsity of linear notions of legal time in Western law runs in
parallel with literature that is concerned with decolonising methods in
academic research. Lisa Tilley, critiquing sociology and anthropology,
writes that linear time and its implications are indicative of a colonial
mindset that separated European man from his research subjects in the
global south, whereby the European man’s time was in motion, while
the research subject remained static and preserved; and papered over
the violence and extractive nature of such research through deploying
the ideals of both work and progress (2017: 30-31).

This teleological nature of time denied the repetitive cycles of
extractive research practices, whereby the researcher grew in knowledge
while the subject endured ‘colonising repetitions’. Using the term
‘spirals’, borrowed from Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Tilley highlights
the circular nature of time – both for some indigenous communities,
and as part of research methodology (2017: 31). The idea of spirals
resonates with Valverde’s spatiotemporality – both highlighting that
the notion of linear time is at best an out-dated way in which to view
the law; and at worst, a framework that can actively disenfranchise and
reinforce colonial hierarchies of progress.
Considering truth-seeking after atrocity and the bodies engaged
with it from Leiboff’s theatrical perspective – in other words, how
theatricality and bodies interacting in space inspire the prioritisation
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of bodily response – foregrounds the corporeal as key in navigating the
potential injustices of law stripped bare of all but rule and doctrine. This
section has highlighted the power of bodily response and experience,
examining authors who claim that foregrounding the corporeal inside
the law can recalibrate perceptions of justice; re-animate a positivist
legal approach currently severed form the lifeworlds that created legal
frameworks; and act as a bridge between the supposedly distinct worlds
of the everyday and state power when considering truth recovery after
violence. Further, a corporeal approach highlights the importance of
movement, rhythm and spatiotemporality, bringing forward notions
of spiralling and cyclicality that would otherwise be over-looked in
conventional legal analysis. This article now turns to the Marikana
Commission itself, to demonstrate the ideas laid out above. The next
section will highlight the cyclicality foregrounded by the prioritisation
of corporeal performativity; whilst also offering some redemption
through examining bodily performance. In this way, corporeality can
be seen as a way to not only identify dangerous cyclicality overlooked
by the law – but also, to break it.
3 Linear law: the Marikana Commission of Inquiry
The Marikana Commission of Inquiry, despite being outside a
court of law, was a fundamentally legal creation. The Chair of this
Commission was announced as Ian Farlam – a retired judge of South
Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal, referred to by a colleague as ‘a really
traditional lawyer’ (Killean 2016: 21). The first Terms of Reference
(ToR), published on 12 September 2012, laid out the relevant
legislation that provided for the creation of such a Commission of
Inquiry, as well as provided guidance on how such a Commission
should be both constituted and managed. The ToR cite section 84(2)
(f ) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, as providing
for the creation of the Commission; and the Commissions Act 1947
as providing for the management of the mechanism (South African
Government 2012). Alongside this founding in law, the ToR also
allowed the Commission to refer matters for legal prosecution, further
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investigation or for the creation of a separate inquiry; and clause 6
ensured that the regulations would allow the Commission powers to
search premises, secure witness attendance and compel the production
of documentation (South African Government 2012).

Legal rules were also in place for the presenting of evidence outside
of the Commission’s formal investigative staff structure: anyone
could submit evidence, but such evidence would need to be called
to the Commission through the serving of a subpoena, meaning the
furnishing of particulars – including name, address and some form of
identification such as a South African Identity Document or passport
– would be required for the serving of such a subpoena (Marikana
Commission of Inquiry 2012). Such formal channels did not take into
account the transient, unstable and sometimes illegal employment and
housing conditions of migrant mineworkers and their families; and
by choosing this process for the submission of evidence, effectively
removed anyone who was not able to access state documentation, from
contributing evidence to the Commission.

The way in which bodies interacted with this quasi-legal mechanism
was primarily negotiated by the legal processes of the Commission
– linear and teleological – ascribing a specific endpoint to the
Commission – the submission of the Final Report to the President
of South Africa – through a strategy of progressive building blocks,
each propelling the path of the Commission forward to a final end
point: ‘The Commission shall inquire into, make findings, report
on and make recommendations’ (South African Government 2012).
The Commission was specific about these progressive building blocks
having the purpose of closure: as closing arguments began, evidence
leader Geoff Budlender summarised one of the key purposes of the
Commission as ‘looking forward’ (Marikana Commission of Inquiry
Day 294: 38494-5). The ToR were also clear that this progression would
be managed through the application of legal procedure, highlighting
that these progressive steps would be undertaken by consulting ‘the
Constitution and other relevant legislation, policies and guidelines’
(South African Government 2012) as well as the Regulations for the
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Marikana Commission that were published in the Government Gazette
on 28 September 2012. The order of the Commission’s operation was
also strictly regulated through legal procedure: documents for the
witness would be circulated; the witness would be examined-in-chief,
cross-examined by stakeholders in a pre-determined order, then reexamined and dismissed.

Any attempts to disrupt the linear progress of the Commission were
summarily dealt with, with the Chair constantly reminding himself
and the Commission attendees of their obligation to the President of
South Africa and its citizens: the production of the Final Report, as
articulated in this quote:
In bringing the work of the Commission to a conclusion we have to
strike the proper balance between two matters. On one hand to ensure,
the need to ensure that the process is fair and as inclusive as possible.
On the other hand, the need for us to report as soon as possible to the
President and to the people of South Africa on the very important
matters which are raised in our terms of reference. The Commission
is committed to completing its task without undue delay and will do
everything reasonable in its power to achieve that result. (Marikana
Commission of Inquiry Day 118: 12246).

When time pressures began to be felt, new cross-examination rules
were introduced; when this failed to save the amount of time needed,
lawyers were allotted specific time slots for their questions, with the
Chair cutting them off, sometimes in mid-question, when their time
capacity had been reached. As Farlam stated, ‘we have rules that we
have introduced and we’ve got to stick to them. So that’s the end of
your cross-examination’ (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 230:
28480). The Marikana Commission’s focus on moving from a starting
point to an end point, achieving closure along the way, is exactly the
kind of false linearity Valverde challenges through her focus on spatiotemporality inside legal spaces. The focus on causality – that a set of
procedures involving witness statements, corroborated and interrogated
by legal practitioners will result in truth and closure – highlights
Leiboff’s concern that these kinds of legal interactions risk injustice if
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they deny experiences of events that do not follow these rules.

Bodies were largely irrelevant to these procedures. For example,
bodily absence at the Commission was an obstacle to be navigated, not
an obstruction that encouraged reflection or change of operations. This
was made clear when the examination of witnesses continued in spite
of a widespread walk-out that removed most key stakeholders from the
Commission’s operation. This walkout was based on financial exclusion,
an issue which had been a sticking point from the Commission’s
inception. Key parties at the Commission – one of whom had already
acknowledged responsibility for the shooting, SAPS – were robustly
financed by their respective government departments and had big teams
of lawyers at their disposal. The widows and family members of those
who had died at Marikana, were substantially less monied – but had
access to financial support from Legal Aid South Africa. The injured
and arrested miners had no access to any state financial support to
enable them to hire lawyers or represent their case. This extremely
asymmetrical situation was compounded by the fact that the state was
funding those who many viewed as the culprits, leaving minimum
wage labourer victims to fend for themselves.
Both advocates for the widows, Dumisa Ntsebeza, and the
injured and arrested mineworkers, Dali Mpofu, flagged this financial
discrepancy on the first day of the Commission; and Mpofu continued
to raise financial fair play as a key issue to ensure attendance at
the Commission of all interested parties, not merely those with
resources. Things came to a head in June 2013, when Mpofu told the
Commission that he was going to court to compel the state to pay for
the injured and arrested miners’ legal representation – his own fee.
Until the court had ruled, he would not participate in the Commission.
Despite the absence of such a major stakeholder, Farlam continued
the Commission. Two days later, the lawyers for the families and the
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union’s legal team also
absented themselves indefinitely in solidarity. On the following day,
the Bapo Ba Mogale withdrew; two days after this, in the absence of
most major players apart from the SAPS and the National Union of
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Mineworkers (NUM), the Legal Resources Centre stood down too.
Mpofu’s applications for postponement were repeatedly denied, and
the Commission continued to hear witnesses until a court ruling in
Mpofu’s favour resulted in him returning to the Commission half-way
through October 2013.

But not even this lack of legal representation could alter or derail
the progress the Commission was focused on. When the lawyers’
walk-out left a substantial amount of people unrepresented, the Chair
simply assigned the task of safe-guarding those people’s interests to the
evidence leaders, justifying this by stating that it was their job anyway
to ‘put the facts before the Commission’ (Marikana Commission of
Inquiry Day 120: 12294). This new procedural rule was hotly contested
by Mpofu when he argued for a postponement a few days later,
reminding the Chair that only his team had consulted with his clients
for almost a year, and that asking his clients to rely on the evidence
leaders, while the SAPS were sporting a state-funded staff of seven,
was ‘really kicking the victims in the teeth’ (Marikana Commission
of Inquiry Day 129: 13570). Despite the argument that the Marikana
Commission was prioritising ‘expedition and speed at the expense of
reconciliation’ (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 129: 13557)
with the postponement application denied, the witnesses kept coming
and the Commission kept going.3 The assumption that the evidence
leaders – legal practitioners in their own right – would somehow be
neutral vehicles for the representation of a wide range of contestatory
stakeholders highlights Leiboff’s concern that the law creates its own
‘closed world’, becoming problematically self-referential and thus,
unable to see and act on potential injustices within its operation.
The unstoppable progression of the Marikana Commission – even
in the face of absent legal representatives – indicates how focused the
Commission was the attainment of its end goal – the Final Report.
The Final Report was continually articulated as the ultimate prize of
the Commission, despite literature that cautions pinning closure on
such a document. Gerry Simpson argues that judicial inquiries, with
their narrow ambits, can never realistically aspire to closure (2007: 139).
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Hakan Gustafsson agrees, stating that an attempt at closure through
the law, simply amplifies the inevitable gaps and silences that such
closure would leave behind:
We are trying to find and to say the last word, to come to a final
conclusion, to determine a decision and to bring it to a close so that,
in the end, everything will be taken into account … The definite
comment, then … becomes the definite silence (1996: 100).

Unfortunately, a ‘definite silence’ was how many interpreted the
conclusions drawn by this document when it was published in June
2015. This report certainly represented the end of the Commission
and its run, but it fell substantially short on providing closure. Most
importantly, this report offered no clear resolution for some of the most
critical matters the Commission had to deal with. For example, there
was no clear fact-finding on what had happened at the scene of the
second shooting, Scene 2. The shooting at the first scene was caught
on camera, and the discussion of liability there boiled down to what
was an acceptable interpretation of self-defence. But the shootings at
Scene 2 were much more disturbing. Forensic evidence suggested that
the men killed there had been shot from behind, and eye-witnesses
reported men being shot while surrendering and begging for mercy.
The police had difficult questions to answer about how, at the very least,
their chain of command and communication broke down.
But ultimately, the Commission was unable to answer this key
question. Answering legal questions requires knowledge of fact and
evidence, and the Commission had this to say about Scene 2: ‘To accept
or reject any version, with any degree of certainty, requires further
interrogation of many factors’ (Farlam, Tokota and Hemraj 2015:
326-328). So this Final Report, the ultimate aim that years of linear
legality had been focused on, succeeded only in summing up its own
ineffectiveness. The teleological, linear progress of the Commission
had succeeded in reaching its end goal; but the result of this end goal
fell far short of expectations.
This section has briefly highlighted how the Marikana Commission
can be interpreted as an example of Leiboff’s ‘positivist purisprudence’
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– a space of ‘unadorned rules’ where the law creates a closed space of selfreferential doctrine and procedure (2019: 10). The focus on linearity, and
the teleological assumptions of progress and closure brings Valverde’s
critique of Western legal ideals to the fore, demonstrating how the
Marikana Commission’s denial of how time, space and lifeworlds
interact could lead to injustice and irrelevance – and replicates imperial
ideals of progress at any cost. The following section will expand on
these critiques by analysing key instances of bodily performance at the
Marikana Commission. Leiboff’s theatrical response – whereby bodily
awareness beyond the self is prioritised before intellectual reaction – and
Clarkson’s ideas of how prioritising lived experience can expose new
perceptions of justice, demonstrate how corporeal perspectives reveal
cyclicality in direct contrast to legal linearity.
4 Cycles and rhythms
Bodily experience of the Marikana Commission’s legal approach
created its own rhythm, almost as soon as the Commission began.
The sections that follow investigate the bodily performance – or
‘encounters’ – of those who Basu (2010) would define as ‘authentically,
even aggressively ordinary’ – those who positivist law deems irrelevant
or extraneous to the critical legal question of forensic truth. By
foregrounding such lived experience at the Commission, it is clear
that a two-tier system was in operation: with legal procedure creating
a linear, progressive timeline, and bodily experience highlighting –
through its performance – the futility of such attempts at linear truthseeking through the development of cycles of repetition. In place of
legal procedure’s focus on teleology and the overriding goal of forward
motion, an embodied perspective reveals how cyclical truth-seeking
after atrocity can be; and highlights the fragmented worlds that those
pulled into its gravitational force endured, despite truth-seeking’s
commitment to uncovering a singular, accepted narrative of events.
Agreeing with Henri Lefebvre’s contention that rhythmic analysis can
reveal the ‘antagonistic unity’ of linearity and cyclicality, this section
suggests key moments of bodily performance that demonstrate the
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power of bodily engagement to alter, change and mould legal space.
Using Leiboff ’s theatrical focus on the immediacy of bodily response,
this section also shows how foregrounding corporeal actions do not
only reveal cyclicality in the face of legal teleology – but demonstrate
disruption of the repetitious subjugation of the ordinary and everyday
body inside truth-seeking after atrocity.
A Bodily cycles: the performance of presence

The issue of travel is one of the clearest instances of bodily experience
developing an alternative, cyclical rhythm to the Commission. Family
members of the deceased and injured live in far-flung rural locations
around South Africa; and some are in other countries altogether, like
Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Malawi. Travel stipends for
family members travelling to the Commission’s proceedings were only
provided for in the Commission regulations on 14 November 2012,
while the Commission began hearings in October; and attendance
at the Commission meant absence from home and its duties. With
victims of the massacre being entirely male,4 the women who survived
their family members now had to make difficult choices: to be present
at the Commission, or to earn a living, care for children, and look
after homesteads, livestock and assets. Many women attempted a
compromise, travelling to and from the Commission in regular cycles
that they tried to time with the deposition or cross-examination of
witnesses by their own lawyers. The ebb and flow of the widows’
attendance made little impact on the truth-finding program of the
Commission. But their periodic presences and absences hinted to
a world outside the Commission’s walls, and provides a way in to
understanding the Marikana Commission from a perspective of
fragmentation, rather than the teleological coherence suggested by legal
procedure. Leiboff’s salient critique that law does not concern itself
with the lifeworlds it impacts is of critical relevance here.
The repetitive presence/absence through travel of the widows of the
Marikana massacre is representative of how some of the Commission’s
key stakeholders felt themselves caught up in a cyclical spiral, pulling
them both backwards towards their past history, and then propelling

97

Robyn Gill-Leslie

them forward again into the Commission’s operation – only to be
pulled backwards again as they were required to travel between
home and the Commission. This incessant motion, evocative of Silvia
Rivera Cusicanqui’s spirals, placed alongside the perpetual stasis that
is inherent in waiting on the law – waiting to hear legal arguments,
waiting for the exposition that it seemed would only arrive with the
Final Report – made some attendees physically ill. The psychological
motion-sickness of so much moving and yet so much stasis was summed
up by Nandipha Gunuza, a widow of the massacre: ‘If the commission
doesn’t come to an end soon, it will make us all sick, literally’ (Falanga
2014). Journalist Gabi Falanga (2014), who interviewed some of the
widows, explained how the women felt trapped by stagnation: while the
Commission appeared no closer to its end goals, their lives at homes
also came to a standstill while they performed the long commute to
and from the Commission. Mary Langa, another widow, explains to
Falanga: ‘The children are expecting us to bring something home.
They don’t understand the commission; they think we’re away working.
It’s pretty bad for us but there’s nothing else we can do’ (2014). In her
work with the Khulumani Support Group, Agnes Makopano Thelejane
articulates the confusion that comes from such continual splitting
between home and away, when she states: ‘I am standing here not
knowing what to say as I am moving in and out of this Commission.
I don’t know what I am going to combine to make life’ (Bonase and
Seidman 2013: 8). Gunuza, Langa and Thelejane are demonstrating a
disturbing and painful aspect of the Commission’s three year run – a
fragmentation between bodies and their worlds, as these women are
forced to subject themselves to a cyclical double life, split between
home and away, dividing their bodies up between competing demands.
Of course, not only women attended the Commission: other family
members, including brothers, uncles, fathers and grandfathers also
attended to hear what had happened to their loved ones. Interviewed
by journalist Niren Tolsi, Andile Yawa described his cyclical journeys
to the Commission, to hear the truth about what happened to his
son, Cebisile. Yawa was himself a miner, before he was medically
boarded with lung disease, and his son took his place on the mine. He
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explains how these journeys to the Commission are simply a repeat
of the journeys he made when he was still a migrant labourer: ‘There
are similarities in these journeys … but now [after these trips to the
Commission] I come back with nothing. Before, there was money and
I was making a living for my family’ (Tolsi 2014). But his daily routine
is not the only thing that has spiralled back towards a time he thought
was past: he explains that his relationship with his wife, Nosipho,
has reverted back to what it was during his time on the mines – with
the similarly compressed time they are now able to spend together
reminding them both of his years of distant labour (Tolsi 2014).
Confusion and co-mingling between past, present and future
disrupts the idea that a single, linear engagement with truth-finding
after atrocity can encapsulate the aftermath of violence. As Andile
Yawa finds himself cast back into decades-past living patterns, and the
widows split themselves into many parts to cover both the stasis and
the endless movement required of them, time becomes more complex
than a teleological Commission with a beginning, a middle and an
ending can encapsulate.
B Bodily cycles: absence as safe / presence as dangerous

In contrast to this cyclical experience of those travelling to and from
the Commission, the methodical legal approach of the Commission
– and its focused, linear trajectory – was unassailable: any attempts to
waylay progression of the Commission through bodily absence were
summarily dealt with through legal procedure. One of the key issues
such procedure had to address, to keep propelling the Commission
forward to progress, was how stakeholders were interpreting the
physical space of the Commission as dangerous.
Fear, trauma and intimidation – both real and perceived – were
key bodily experiences at the Marikana Commission. Fear was woven
into the fabric of the Commission from the first day, when advocate
Dali Mpofu – lawyer for the injured and arrested miners – flagged
that some of his clients and witnesses were too afraid to testify at the
Commission, fearing reprisals: ‘People are … uneasy about coming
forward with evidence, they’re uneasy about the prospect of
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giving oral evidence’ (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 1: 41).
Mpofu reported to the Commission that some of his witnesses had
been arrested and taken to four different police stations; some were
granted bail and then immediately re-arrested (Marikana Commission
of Inquiry Day 5: 383). He further alleged that those arrested were
subjected to torture, and accused the police of using attendance at the
Commission as an ‘informal ID parade’, with people being followed
to and from the Commission in an attempt to crack down on so-called
trouble-makers or those involved in police fatalities in the days leading
up to the massacre (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 5: 391).
Mpofu often reported his clients were absent due to fear, as well as
due to tensions in their community at Marikana. As Mpofu stated,
‘they would like to be here but they also don’t want to be killed when
they get home’ (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 101: 10872).
Mpofu’s statement of the division his clients felt mirrors the
complex splitting of lives that the widows articulated in the previous
section. When Farlam was challenged on this aspect of witness safety,
he was quick to reassure everyone that the Witness Protection Act 1998,
as well as the ‘full weight of the law’, were at the Commission’s disposal
(Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 48: 5258). However, this
provided no reassurance or assistance to the vast majority of Mpofu’s
more than 250 clients, the majority of whom were not sworn in as
witnesses. The weight of such law could provide no protections for them.
Bodily absence from fear and intimidation gave an impression of
the Commission as a dangerous place that was risky to be involved
in. Indeed, a small paragraph, four pages before the end of the Final
Report, acknowledges the ‘fear factor’ of presence at the Commission
– adding only that such fear was indeed a ‘justifiable suspicion’; and
that murder to prevent the giving of evidence was ongoing (Farlam,
Tokota and Hemraj 2015: 560). Yet, this Commission was the only
sanctioned space where truth-seeking after the atrocity of the massacre
was taking place. As Mpofu says, his clients wanted to be present – but
they also wanted to stay safe.
These two needs were conflictual, not symbiotic. Fear separated
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bodies from the world they wanted to be present in, resulting in absence
from the only designated space that was focused on truth recovery after
the massacre. The body absent due to fear creates a different evaluation
of the Commission: deemed a place where truth and justice take place,
some bodies viewed it as a place where trouble, hardship and death
were more likely. This was painfully articulated by one of Mpofu’s
witnesses, himself suffering from advanced cancer, who described the
suicide of one of his comrades who was injured in the massacre, and
had attended the Commission:
That person was also shot and he was now walking with crutches.
He used to attend the Commission whilst it was sitting in
Rustenburg. He was stressed … He had to go to the hospital, he
ended up hanging himself. Now things like that make you feel very
bad (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 275: 36168).

This suicide could be the suicide referred to in a memoranda
handed to the Commission’s Chair, Ian Farlam, on 1 April 2014,
whereby a group of people labelling themselves ‘concerned members
of the community’ complained to the Chair that one of their body had
been ‘displayed in public against their will’ at the Commission via a
subpoena, and had subsequently committed suicide (Farlam, Tokota
and Hemraj 2015: 590). Fear and death became further intertwined in
July 2014, when Mpofu angrily reported to the Commission that a man
mentioned by name in testimony from a SAPS source, Mr Bongani
Mehlomkomo, had been gunned down. Mpofu stated that his clients
were speculating whether this murder was linked to the evidence given
that accused this man of wrong-doing – evidence which they said was
completely false (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 261: 32808).

The Commission’s distinction as a place of danger, not one of reliable
legal procedure leading to ‘truth, restoration and justice’,5 was further
cemented when the same memoranda referred to above described how
infuriated the signatories were at the treatment one SAPS witness,
Mr X, received from the Commission. This witness, known to the
public as ‘Mr X’, had requested anonymity due to fears for his physical
safety and gave his testimony from a secret location known only to the
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Commission. He took the stand in-camera, with the general public
banned from entering during his testimony; only those who could
prove they were a client of a lawyer at the Commission were allowed
to hear his evidence. His voice gave testimony without his corporeal
body, the sounds and pixelated images coming from video-linked TV
screens displayed around the room (Gill-Leslie 2019: 118).

The memorandum authors viewed his bodily absence as privilege,
and accused the Commission of giving Mr X ‘special treatment’
(Farlam, Tokota and Hemraj 2015: 589). In particular, they demanded
that Mr X give testimony ‘in the same way as other witnesses who
were also afraid’ – in others words, with his body present in the
courtroom, subject to the same perceived dangers that others had to
face (Farlam, Tokota and Hemraj 2015: 590). This was compounded
by the general view – supported by the Final Report – that Mr X had
routinely fabricated his testimony, in an attempt to discredit the striking
mineworkers and vindicate the SAPS (eg Nicolson 2014).

The Commission was viewed by some as being a place of danger,
where the threat of physical harm over-shadowed participation; and
yet, the Commission continued its operation without modifying any
proceedings. Indeed, in response to the memorandum, Farlam washed
his hands of such concerns, explaining that any special requests for
alternative testimony arrangements had to be evaluated against legal
procedure rules – the first of which was the lawyer’s duty to request such
treatment from the Commission beforehand, which no lawyer had done
for other witnesses. The law, as per Leiboff’s arguments, must protect
its interpreters from the unpredictability of bodily unruliness. This
refusal to acknowledge both the detrimental and beneficial aspects of
bodily absence at the Commission, in favour of legal procedural rules
that made forward motion inevitable, was a reduction of the kind of
justice being delivered. This dismissal of these concerns around fear and
safety, while conforming with legal procedure, came across as narrow
and lacking in compassion. It was a wilful rejection of complexity,
in favour of the ease of the known and legally protected rules, which
continued to usher the Commission forward.
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This section has suggested that the rhythm created through bodily
experience at the Commission is in contrast to the teleological progress
of the Commission; and that this alternative rhythm, developed
through bodily experience, raises important evaluations of the
Commission that legal procedure has ignored. The alternative rhythm
of bodily experience raises the concerns of the Commission as a place
of danger, not truth and justice; the fact that some kinds of voluntary
absence were interpreted as a reflection of privilege, which created
a hierarchy of stakeholders that was counter to the ideal of equality
before the law; and that bodily absence resulted in a disjunction or
fragmentation between bodies and their worlds – whether through
the presence of voice without the corresponding corporeality – or the
splitting of attendees, who divided themselves numerous times between
lives at home and lives at the Commission.
This section’s focus on lived experience has embodied key critiques
from Leiboff and Valverde when considering how law that denies the
body can deny justice and absolve itself of responsibility for its impact
and actions. A focus on lived experience has highlighted, as per
Clarkson’s ideas of recalibration, how perceptions of the justice on offer
at the Marikana Commission can change when considering corporeal
as opposed to procedural goals. But Leiboff ’s ideas on theatrical
jurisprudence highlight how recognising bodily response – being aware
of impact beyond the self, triggered by lived experience – can allow
the law to react to injustice. This next section highlights two bodily
performances at the Marikana Commission that aimed to do just that.
C When the body breaks the cycle: performance as challenge

Mr Vusimuzi Mandla Mabuyakhulu was one of the first survivors
of the Marikana massacre to appear before the Commission. He was
injured in a pre-massacre clash on 11 August 2012, while marching to
the NUM offices. His medical records show him receiving a head injury
as well as a gunshot wound near to his spinal column, which required
extensive hospitalisation. As survivors took the witness stand, it was
clear that they were only present to substantiate or refute aspects of their
written statements that had been submitted to the Commission already.
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As participants tellingly referred to the Commission’s operations as a
‘script’,6 it was clear that survivors were not there to offer anything new
or off-point. That is, until Mr Mabuyakhulu asked the Commission to
look at his stomach wound.

As per the Marikana Commission’s requirements, Mabuyakhulu
submitted a written statement on which he was examined and crossexamined. During his evidence in chief, Mr Mabuyakhulu’s advocate,
Dali Mpofu, took on Mr Mabuyakhulu’s voice and read part of Mr
Mabuyakhulu’s statement into the record at the Commission in the
first person. Mpofu spoke:
I now have a bloated bubble of skin on my stomach which is expanding
inside over the malt, the soft skin covered in the wound keeps on
expanding to the extent that my intestines are visible from the
outside. When I lie down on my back the bubble deflates (Marikana
Commission of Inquiry Day 48: 5296).

In spite of his words being voiced by his lawyer, Mr Mabuyakhulu
also wanted to physically show the Commission his injuries, as a protest
against that fact that he had been declared fit for work by Lonmin
mine. Mr Mabuyakhulu is a rock drill operator, a physically arduous
job that requires the carrying, lifting and operation of heavy machinery
balanced on the stomach, as well as the ability to crouch, crawl and
stand for long hours underground. But the Chair refused his request,
stating that that kind of physical, visual demonstration ‘adds an element’
(Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 48: 5296), implying such a
viewing would introduce an element of theatricality that was out of
place in such a setting. Mr Mabuyakhulu saw this imposition of legal
etiquette as unfair, and countered the Chair’s refusal to see his injured
body. He said, ‘I would have liked the commission to say [sic] how I
look like and that is why, the reason why I refuse to go underground.
I do not know why the commission does not want to see it’ (Marikana
Commission of Inquiry Day 48: 5297).
A debate began, as the Chair attempted to placate Mr Mabuyakhulu,
saying the Commission would have no power to determine whether
he is fit for work, and that the Commission does ‘accept that you have
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the injury that you described [own emphasis]’ (Marikana Commission of
Inquiry Day 48: 5298). The Chair deflected the request by indicating
that Lonmin’s Senior Counsel was present and suggested he review
Mabuyakhulu’s fitness to work through a referral to a medical specialist
– which was acceded to (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 48:
5299). The Chair’s view that a description of injury was sufficient and
fair was juxtaposed with Mr Mabuyakhulu’s view that physical display
of his body – a performance of his wounds - was necessary. It became
increasingly clear that the Chair could not continue to disallow a sworn
witness from displaying his injuries, and while still refusing for the
wounds to be displayed in public, he and his fellow Commissioners
agreed to view Mabuyakhulu’s body in Chambers, after which, the
Chair stated ‘I can understand where he is coming from’ (Marikana
Commission of Inquiry Day 48: 5322).
The insistence of showing his body meant Mr Mabuyakhulu was
able to insert himself into proceedings that, while ostensibly gave him
a fair platform to discuss what happened to him, did not allow his voice
and body, unmediated by lawyers, to be heard and seen. Not only was
his physical body and his injury able to influence the Chair to change his
original ruling, he was also able to utilise this opportunity to advocate
for his well-being outside of the court room, placing on record the fact
that the Chair asked Lonmin to provide specialist medical assessment.
By showing his body outside of the legal script of question-and-answer,
Mr Mabuyakhulu created an immediate effect – a stretching or bending
– resisting legal procedure’s preferred method of interaction that keeps
the body compliant and subservient to documents. The tranquillity
that law encourages, that is a direct result of legal procedure’s balance
between permission and restriction, was broken; the viewing of the
wound highlighted that ‘without bodies, there is no law’, as law is
fundamentally relational (Mandic et al 2016: 4-6).
Mabuyakhulu’s demand that his physical body be shown and viewed
also seemed to provide a bridge between two men of vastly differing
circumstances. After viewing his wound, albeit in private, the Chair
claimed that he now understood Mabuyakhulu’s pain and frustration.
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The traditional hierarchy that places judges and lawyers above those
whose stories they elicit, was altered – even if just for a moment – as
the Chair’s sensory world expanded to include Mr Mabuyakhulu’s pain.
The Chair emerged changed from this experience. At the outset, the
Chair testily stated that he believed Mabuyakhulu’s injuries were ‘as
described’ and he didn’t need to see them. But after his body was shown,
the Chair acknowledged Mabuyakhulu’s perspective, embodying
Clarkson’s ideas of lived experience recalibrating perspectives of what
counts and who matters.

Leiboff’s theatrical jurisprudence seeks out moments like this –
whereby an instinctual, bodily response expands the law’s ability to
see outside of itself – and rectify injustice. The Chair’s encounter with
Mabuyakhulu’s injured body became a way to bridge the gap between
those who have such bodily knowledge, such as Mr Mabuyakhulu,
and those who do not, such as the Chair, Ian Farlam. This encounter,
as per Basu’s definition, provides a bridge between daily life and the
power of state sponsored truth-seeking that denies the realities of those
lifeworlds it is ostensibly designed to remedy.
This renegotiation of the traditional power dynamic between a
judge and a witness at the Marikana Commission demonstrates the
power of prioritising lived experience; or as Leiboff states, responding
through the body. Such a renegotiation of authority, and the importance
of Mabuyakhulu’s actions, became even clearer two days later, when a
similar engagement occurred with a second survivor of the massacre.
Mr Phatsha came to the witness stand on Day 50 of the Commission,
and was one of the striking mineworkers caught up in the massacre on
16 August 2012. After attempting to escape from police fire, he jumped
a fence into a kraal (a place fenced off, in which livestock is kept, near
an informal settlement), when he had cause to look down at his foot:
What I noticed on my toe is that it was burst open and only a piece of
flesh was left, or remaining … it then gave me some difficulty running
because this was a piece of flesh which was still sticking, so the whole,
the bone in fact of my toe was completely gone and only a piece of
flesh was remaining (Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 50: 5439).
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Mr Phatsha explained that he was forced to cut this piece of flesh
off, to enable him to continue moving. He came to the Commission
with the same request as Mr Mabuyakhulu:
Mr Chairperson, I have this request that I have been talking about
this injury, which nobody has seen. I suffer terrible pain. Do I have
the permission to display this before the Commission? (Marikana
Commission of Inquiry Day 53: 5681).

This time, after gaining clarity from his lawyer, the Chair allowed
the wound to be seen and displayed in public, in the auditorium, and
directed that the wound be photographed and added to the exhibit list.
Phatsha removed his shoe and displayed his foot by placing it on the
table in front of him. Cameras flashed and the spectators gazed. Thus,
a new exhibit was entered into the official legal record. Mr Phatsha
was able not only to achieve his objective of showing his wounds in
public, rather than in Chambers; but to get evidentiary matter placed
onto the official legal record, through having his injury shown and
photographed – photographs which became listed exhibits. Mr
Phatsha, who completed one year of formal schooling and was unable
to read his own statement once it had been taken by his lawyer, inserted
himself into the public record and expanded a chain of evidence that
related to his own injury, through shrewd use of bodily performance. By
forcing a viewing of his physical body – being what Henri Lefebvre and
Leiboff both term unruly – Mr Phatsha performed a complete aboutturn for legal procedure. Instead of the body being a mere carrier for
the confirmation or rejection of predetermined legal texts or images,
Mr Phatsha’s body created his own images and the record thereof creates
text – which legal procedure must sanction, as the exchange happened
inside the Commission’s operation.
Despite both these two encounters being introduced and managed
by advocate Dali Mpofu, the lawyer for the two men, the request
for the showing of bodies came from the men themselves. Mpofu
himself affirms this, when he says that in consultation, his clients
repeatedly stated that they want to show their wounds in public. This
kind of performative self-advocacy, through the tactile and strategic
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performance of wounds, works towards adjusting the skewed view of
fairness and inclusion that allowed judges and lawyers to make demands
upon witnesses – and yet, not the reverse. The body and its demands to
be seen and heard at the Commission had, even temporarily, changed
access to social and political lifeworlds, as Mr Mabuyakhulu and
Mr Phatsha forced the Commissioners and lawyers to reply to their
requests. Legal procedure was pushed to respond rather than solicit.
The power of a bodily experience to alter a preordained power
dynamic masked by the ideal of fairness lies in its ability to impact both
the parties: those exhibiting a bodily performance, and those viewing
it. This altered the preordained place for victims at the Marikana
Commission – the place assigned by the legal view of fairness and
inclusion: that bodily ‘encounters’ were important, but symbolic; that
they could speak, but were mediated by documents and lawyers; that
their lack of legal credentials meant they were present on sufferance
and as guides, not on their own terms or in an unmediated voice. The
manner in which survivors’ bodies and their performances challenged
this is reminiscent of Basu’s view that bodily encounters provide a
bridge between daily life or lived experience and the power of the state
in investigating atrocity.
The bodily performances detailed in this section reject this statesponsored legal procedure’s presumption that the body is merely a
discursive place, used as a path to documentary truth. The result of
these performances is an embodied reaction from the Chair – a reaction
grounded in bodily response, empathy and subsequent decision-making
that empowered ordinary legal subjects. The power of a corporeal
perspective lies not only in its ability to foreground injustice inside
legal fora – but also, to work towards dismantling it.

The creation of an alternative, cyclical rhythm – identifiable through
foregrounding bodily experience – forces a questioning of the relevance
and purpose of linear truth-seeking that aims for the difficult goal of
closure through legal procedure. In particular, the fact that the ultimate
goal – the Final Report – failed to disburse truth and justice on one
of the most concerning aspects of the massacre, Scene 2, reinforces
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the concern that this kind of teleological truth-seeking is risking
redundancy and irrelevance for key stakeholders.

The cyclical nature of bodily experience, and what such cyclicality
can reveal about how stakeholders encountered truth and justice at the
Marikana Commission, is a powerful analytical tool for foregrounding
excluded or marginalised voices. The implication of cycles is that
repetitions form, and new understandings can be based on recognition
of such patterns. Similarly, foregrounding bodily experience and
recognising the resultant cyclical nature of how bodies experienced
truth-seeking at the Marikana Commission, shows the marks, damages
and traumas left behind by both historical and current exploitation
– migrant labour, apartheid and fractured family relationships. A
corporeal lens reveals the cyclical and paradoxical patterns of travel
and stasis that formed an intrinsic part of the Commission’s operations,
but that legal procedure glossed over in its teleological quest for the
Final Report. Bodily experience reveals the fact that truth-finding
after atrocity in South Africa is a rich and complex web of history,
the present, and what is to come. To truly seek justice and ‘truth’, in
this context, requires a perspective that is able to comprehend these
different rhythmic timeframes.
5 Conclusion
This article has suggested that the Marikana Commission’s focus on a
linear trajectory that prioritised progress created a teleological approach
to truth recovery that led towards the production of a Final Report,
and thus, closure. This linearity, enforced by legal procedure, would not
allow bodily experience to impact this course. But by foregrounding
bodily encounters at the Marikana Commission, it becomes clear
that bodies were caught up in a cyclical and repetitious pattern of
engagement with the Commission that stood in stark contrast to legal
procedure’s linearity. These cyclical rhythms showed the Commission
was considered a place of danger, not safety; a place where inequality
and privilege influenced proceedings; and where legal procedure often
led to a fragmentation of bodies from their worlds. Such linearity was
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made even more problematic by the publication of the Final Report,
which failed to offer the long-awaited and advertised ‘closure’ for some
stakeholders.
By the Marikana Commission’s failure to recognise the ‘antagonistic
unity’ of linear and cyclical rhythms, as brought forward by a bodily
perspective, the Commission was risking irrelevance for those
stakeholders most impacted by the massacre – widows, survivors,
and those injured, arrested and vanished. The alternative perspective
brought to bear by bodily experience shows how disempowering linear
legality can be; and highlights the mismatch of expectations and reality
when considering the long-awaited goal of the Final Report.
The seeking out and valourising of the ‘antagonistic unity’ of linear
and cyclical rhythms reduces the risk of approaches to truth-telling that
actively disempower stakeholders. Recognition of cyclicality alongside
linearity could allow such mechanisms to be better equipped to manage
expectations regarding what can be realistically achieved by these fora
– providing grounding for their oft-mentioned grand ideas of closure,
truth recovery and justice. But critically, focusing on Leiboff’s ideas of
a theatrical response – an immediate and visceral bodily engagement
that uses lived experience to bring law out into the world that created
it – bodily performance can not only alert to issues of injustice, but
actively counter them too. Prioritising corporeal encounters inside
truth-telling after atrocity at Marikana have been shown to increase
empathy, give prominence to the ‘ordinary’ and bring law out of itself
and into the lifeworlds of those it impacts. Such sensory engagement –
and the resultant victories it can claim – demonstrates both the power
and necessity of foregrounding bodily performance inside the law.
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Endnotes
1

Robyn Gill-Leslie is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the University of Leeds.

2

eNCA, Eye Witness News and Reuters were three TV stations with
cameras. See eNCA 2012.

3

The term ‘restoration’ appears in the Marikana Commission’s motto
of ‘truth, restoration and justice’. While different from the term
‘reconciliation’, the motto implied an emphasis on the less forensic aspects
of truth-seeking could be expected from the Commission.

4

The death of Paulina Masuhlo was excluded from the Commission’s ToR.
See Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 102: 10879 – 10882.

5

This is the motto of the Marikana Commission.

6

For examples of this, see Marikana Commission of Inquiry Day 26: 2745,
Day 79: 8400.
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